This delay in striking Syria will also make any eventual strikes less effective. In 2007, when Israel struck the Syrian nuclear reactor then under construction, Israel and the United States engaged in elaborate and successful efforts to maintain secrecy until decisions were made and the strike finally launched. Why? Because it was obvious that Syrian President Bashar Assad could take such steps as putting human hostages (foreigners, political prisoners, or children, for example) at the site if he discovered our intentions. Now we have given him weeks to take steps to protect the chemical weapons-related sites in this manner, and to move the materials to new locations. The president said this would make no difference, providing this evidence: Gen. Martin Dempsey, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, has “indicated to me that our capacity to execute this mission is not time-sensitive.”

First of all, what mission is that? No one knows the proposed size and target list, of course. If the mission is to protect the president from his “red line” comment of last year and make a symbolic show, it is not time-sensitive; it is not useful, either. Indeed, the narrower the proposed mission, the less time-sensitive it is.

Second, are we to be reassured by this vague comment from Dempsey, who has spent the entire last year explaining why a strike at Syria would be disastrous and is nearly impossible anyway, requiring hundreds of air sorties in advance? Unfortunately, the general’s interventions in policymaking on Syria, which have gone far beyond his expertise and proper role, have eliminated him as a reliable guide.