Throw this on the rising pile of evidence that, whatever the true number of Russian casualties in Ukraine it might be, it has lots of zeroes in it.
Two weeks ago I wrote about the UK’s assessment that Russian forces have begun to stall out in Ukraine. Too many dead and wounded, too much logistical disruption, too much pressure from advanced western weapons like HIMARS that are now being wielded by the Ukrainians. How’s that UK assessment looking two weeks later?
#Russian Defense Minister Sergey Shoigu stated on August 24 that Russian forces are slowing down the overall pace of their offensive operations in #Ukraine while reaffirming that Russia’s objectives in the war have not changed.
Read today's report: https://t.co/UAnG9dzEAV pic.twitter.com/52ld3zyP0w
— ISW (@TheStudyofWar) August 24, 2022
Shoigu’s reasoning for this allegedly voluntary slowdown was, no joke, that the humanitarians in the Russian high command are concerned about mounting civilian casualties and wanted to give the Ukrainians a break. Meanwhile, less than 24 hours ago, Russia celebrated Ukraine’s independence day by firing a missile at a railway station, killing at least 25 people. Five of the victims burned to death in a vehicle. Two of the dead were kids aged six and 11.
Their offensive has slowed down not because they care even a little bit about the lives of Ukrainians but because, after six months, they’re finally out of gas. Ukraine has cut numerous supply lines into the southern part of the country by bombing bridges and freight rail lines. They’ve hit multiple ammo depots deep inside Russian-held territory, starving the invaders of weapons. The high casualty rate has left many Russian combat units depleted and possibly unable to function effectively. They’re so desperate for manpower that they’re allegedly recruiting in prisons.
Putin needs more cannon fodder. He sent down the order today that, beginning in January of next year, he wants a bigger army — 13 percent bigger, to be precise, which means adding 137,000 more troops. “Adding them from where?” you ask. Good question.
Putin’s decree did not specify whether the expansion would be accomplished by widening the draft, recruiting more volunteers, or both. But some Russian military analysts predicted heavier reliance on volunteers because of the Kremlin’s concerns about a potential domestic backlash from an expanded draft…
The Kremlin has said that only volunteer contract soldiers take part in the Ukraine war. But it may be difficult to find more willing soldiers, and military analysts said the planned troop levels may still be insufficient to sustain operations…
Another Russian military expert, Alexei Leonkov, noted that training on complex modern weapons normally takes three years. And draftees serve only one year.
They might be able to scrape together more troops. But they ain’t gonna be good troops.
I assume that today’s order is partly a symbolic gesture aimed at showing the west that Putin is committed to winning in Ukraine. Consider it a countermove to the announcement this week by the White House that it’s allocating $3 billion towards the long-term military fitness of Ukraine’s army, a demonstration of its own commitment to the fight. The true test of wills will come a few months from now when temperatures drop in Europe and Europeans suddenly have to figure out how to stay warm without Russian gas. Demoralization of Ukraine’s patrons is Putin’s best play short-term, writes Robert Kelly, as a brutal winter will force EU leaders to pressure Zelensky to end the war ASAP. But if the western alliance can get through that period without giving up, Russia will face hard choices next year about how much longer it’s willing and able to continue. Putin needs a near-term capitulation to keep hope of some sort of limited victory alive, says Kelly.
And even if he gets one, the increasingly lethal Ukrainian insurgency will make life unhappy for Russian occupiers for years to come.
Pavel Luzin is an expert on the Russian military who looked at the problems facing the force in Ukraine in a piece last week called “The Finite Army.” Ukraine has almost certainly already taken Russia’s best punch, Luzin explains. As the war drags on, the quality of the Russian army will continue to degrade.
[T]here is no doubt that continued war and rising losses, which are increasingly difficult to hide, will motivate young men to avoid conscription at least as strongly as they did this spring. As a consequence, the cumulative shortfall of new soldiers in 2022 could reach at least 90,000. This means that together with the number of those killed and wounded in the war, the Russian Armed Forces are unlikely to exceed 600,000−630,000 people by the end of the year. With their nominal strength of one million, this will inevitably lead to an aggravation of the already serious organisational problems and disruptions…
In fact, the regional battalions which are now being formed are also not sufficient to bridge the gap in military manpower. Firstly, they are not really battalions: a few dozen to a couple of hundred men do not make it possible to establish a full-fledged battalion. Secondly, the characteristics of the men recruited to such formations, i.e. their age, health status, intelligence, moral and psychological profile, a priori prevent them from forming combat-ready units. Thirdly, it is not clear what kind of sergeants and officers get into the command staff of such units. Fourthly, financial conditions of service in such ‘battalions’ give rise to doubts since the promised salaries of hundreds of thousands of roubles clearly exceed the income of regular servicemen. In other words, such an income will either trigger a strong tension between the regional ‘battalions’ and the regular military units, or it simply does not exist in the format promised by the regional authorities. All this also applies to the recruitment of prisoners to take part in the war.
Luzin expects that the Kremlin will start pulling troops who are currently guarding military installations and throwing them into the fight, as well as reclassifying certain supporting units (communications, engineering, etc) as combat troops and sending them in too. Depending upon how long the war drags on, there may be few infantry units of any kind by the end that haven’t taken major losses. Putin really does seem intent on smashing the backbone of his military to chase a dream of annexing a country he doesn’t have the money or manpower to pacify long-term.
In lieu of an exit question, read this interesting analysis from a Russian who thinks he knows how Ukraine is pulling off those stunning attacks deep inside Crimea. Has the mystery of the “wonder weapon” been solved?
