Europe’s Foreign Policy Veto Is Not a Flaw

The demand to move to qualified majority voting (QMV) in foreign policy has grown steadily louder in Brussels. For years, the European Commission under Ursula von der Leyen has been pushing to cast off the “shackles of unanimity,” and after Viktor Orbán’s defeat in Hungary’s April elections, it called for “seizing the moment” to break the veto in the Common Foreign and Security Policy. Since April, German Foreign Minister Johann Wadephul has been advocating the abolition of unanimity by the end of the current legislative term and has put forward a six-point plan for reforming the EU’s institutions.

Practice shows just how far this goal is from being realized. On 23 July, only on its third attempt after objections from at least six member states—including Bulgaria, Greece, and Austria— did the Council of the EU manage to agree on the 21st package of sanctions against Russia. Germany’s position on Israel exposed the same tension from another direction. At the European Council in June 2026, Chancellor Friedrich Merz stated that his government had rejected proposed EU trade measures against Israel. The institutional significance lies in Berlin’s insistence that Germany must retain control over how that responsibility is translated into foreign policy—even while its own foreign minister advocates limiting national vetoes in security matters. The gap between the rhetoric of abandoning the veto and the readiness of states to use it when their own interests are at stake is structural.

‘High’ and ‘low’ politics in European integration

An explanation for this state of affairs was offered 60 years ago by Stanley Hoffmann. Against the functionalist “logic of integration,” he set the enduring “logic of diversity” of nation-states. The distinction between “low” and “high” politics allows us to understand why supranational integration has developed successfully in the economy, trade, and regulation, yet it has not led to the formation of a common foreign policy.

“Low politics” covers questions of welfare: trade regimes, tariffs, competition, technical standards, market regulation, agriculture, and particular strands of social and economic policy. In these areas, quantitative assessment, mutual concessions, and package compromises are possible. States can delegate powers without relinquishing political autonomy.