Prigozhin's true value to Putin: Deniability

Indeed, there is a much simpler explanation for Prigozhin’s behavior, one often overlooked by western observers. Despite the personalist nature of Putin’s regime, where the favor of and direct access to the boss decide so much, institutions still matter. And the reality is that the defense ministry is a powerful institution, while Prigozhin is not an institution at all — just a private citizen running a business. In fact, mercenary activity is still illegal under Russian law, and while politicians have lobbied to change that so groups such as Wagner can be better regulated, the Kremlin has so far resisted the attempts. Simply put, the Wagner Group (despite Prigozhin’s recent announcement of himself as its proud founder) is still an illegal entity — one that the Kremlin has relied on substantially for nearly a decade while deliberately keeping it in the legislative shadows.

Putin has not sidelined Prigozhin, he is merely treating him like he has always treated the non-state actors he has relied on throughout his tenure: as an expendable resource, the less official the better. Incentivize them to make their own capital, whether financial (Wagner is allegedly profiting off diamond and gold mines it guards in Africa and is eager to capitalize on Bakhmut) or political (Prigozhin’s success can translate into more Kremlin favor and thus more covert funds). But it suits Putin to keep them in a legal gray area so that they can be disavowed if things go awry. Indeed, one reason why the Russian president avoided launching a full-scale invasion of Ukraine for eight years, relying instead on separatist proxies, nationalist volunteers and private military companies, is because it is exceedingly difficult to disavow one’s entire defense ministry once it has failed to implement orders that were unrealistic from the start.

[The problem for Putin is that the Wagner Group’s tactics are unsustainable in a national military. By forcing a competition between the two, the Russian military will eventually have to adopt Wagner’s tactics and policies, which will erode discipline and regime adherence. That’s one reason why nations don’t let private citizens run their own armies, among many other very good reasons. — Ed]