The problem is not the Afghan soldiers, many of whom are fighting valiantly. The problem is that the complete U.S. withdrawal has made it impossible for them to fight coherently. It has meant not just the disappearance of American troops, who, in any case, hadn’t engaged in direct combat for quite a while. (No U.S. troops have been killed in Afghanistan since early February 2020.) More crucially, it has meant the disappearance of close air support, logistics, intelligence and surveillance, repair and maintenance of weapons and vehicles, medevac units for the wounded, and rapid helicopter transport from one part of the country to another.

Several senior U.S. military officers (active duty and retired) have told me that American ground troops couldn’t fight effectively without these enablers. It is no wonder that Afghan ground troops can’t either.

True, the Taliban don’t have this sort of support network either, but insurgents have less need for it. Their advantage is that they can attack at places and times of their choosing. The disadvantage of the Afghan national security forces—or any army waging a counterinsurgency campaign—is that they have to defeat the insurgency wherever it attacks. This is a difficult but feasible task with integrated intelligence networks, close air support, helicopter transport, and all the rest. It’s nearly impossible without those things.