First, the reset is over. In the past, Russian restraint in not deploying this potent weapons system in an enclave surrounded by NATO members was expected to produce reciprocal gestures, and initially, Moscow interpreted the Obama administration’s decision in September 2009 to cancel the Bush-era BMD program as a sign of conciliation. But the Obama team moved to retool, rather than scrap, the Bush plans.

The U.S. has always maintained that the BMD system in Europe is meant to offset a potential emerging threat from Iran, a claim that has always been met with suspicion in Moscow. So when the interim agreement was signed in Geneva which could lay out a roadmap for a definitive settlement of the Iran nuclear issue, the Russians were expecting some sign that, as long as Iran was suspending its nuclear activities, Washington might in turn suspend its BMD plans. Putin and other Russian officials have pointedly raised this question, asking why the U.S. is continuing to deploy BMD components while heralding the diplomatic breakthrough with Iran. An Iskander deployment would be the clearest signal Moscow could send that it does not accept the U.S. rationale for the system, and may in addition be designed to put pressure on European states to query Washington about the future of BMD if a settlement with Iran is reached.

And while there is guarded optimism over a possible permanent agreement with Iran, the geopolitical competition with the West over Ukraine—an issue Moscow thought was settled after the 2010 Ukrainian elections—has resumed.