Those of us of a certain age will remember the phrase: “Only Nixon can go to China.” After spending most of his political career as a hard-line anti-communist, Richard Nixon saw an opportunity to split Beijing from Moscow in 1972, opening up more friendly diplomatic relations and turning communist China into a counterweight to the Kremlin. Nixon could withstand potential blowback at home and avoid appearing to cave to communism because of his indisputable credibility in fighting communism at home and abroad.

We may be seeing another leader try the same maneuver. Xi Jinping tried proposing a twelve-point plan to end the war in Ukraine this week, mostly vague and notional points that Russia readily rejected. Most expected Volodymyr Zelensky to do the same, given his year-long insistence that fighting would not end until Russia departed all pre-2014 boundaries.

Instead, Politico reports, Zelensky has decided to engage Beijing on the basis of their proposal, such as it is:

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy cautiously welcomed Beijing’s efforts toward ending the war in Ukraine and said he would like to meet with Chinese President Xi Jinping to discuss China’s proposals.

Speaking at a press conference in Kyiv Friday to mark the first anniversary of Moscow’s invasion, Zelenskyy said he was open to considering some aspects of the 12-point “position paper” published by the Chinese foreign ministry. Both NATO and the EU have criticized the initiative, with European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen saying that “China has taken sides” in the Ukraine conflict. …

“I believe that the fact that China started talking about Ukraine is not bad,” Zelenskyy said, according to the Associated Press. “But the question is what follows the words. The question is in the steps and where they will lead to.”

Zelensky has a practical reason for not rejecting China’s overture out of hand, of course:

“I very much want to believe that China will not deliver weapons to Russia, and for me this is very important,” Zelenskyy said, according to Reuters.

Clearly, Zelensky would want to delay that as long as possible, and the best way to do that is to keep China engaging both Kyiv and Moscow for as long as possible. Once Xi starts sending weapons to Putin — assuming he has any desire to do so — Zelensky’s options on Russia’s southeastern borders vanish. Besides, Zelensky likely realizes that the only leverage Ukraine has with China is reputational; Ukraine’s allies in the West can apply economic sanctions, but those will only sting in the long term. Short term, Ukraine can only avoid a Russian restocking via China by making Xi believe he can achieve a settlement by postponing those shipments.

China probably isn’t all that interested in supplying Russia anyway. (Jazz has a different take on this issue in an earlier post, so be sure to read it.) Ukraine doesn’t mean much to them, and neither do Vladimir Putin’s imperialist fantasies except to the extent it could threaten China eventually. A major trade disruption with the West will do damage to both sides, but the West can reconstitute its manufacturing supply chains more quickly that China can find ways to re-establish the industrial espionage it needs to keep advancing as an economic power. That process had already started in the Trump administration, putting a dent in their CM2025 project. The revenue China will get from arms sales to Putin would be dwarfed by the financial and strategic losses that would result from the West’s reactions to those sales.

On top of all that, Xi wants the prestige of imposing a truce or treaty to end the war. It would provide a major boost to his leadership cult in China, which is teetering over Xi’s “zero-COVID” pandemic policies and his heavy-handed oppressive tactics of the last three years.

What about Ukraine? Will Zelensky lose face by negotiating on China’s terms? He has remained stalwart and defiant ever since Russia invaded, insisting that the only terms Ukraine will accept is a full and permanent withdrawal of Russian forces from Ukrainian territory. He has also turned into a surprisingly effective wartime leader, both in military achievement and in maintaining domestic wartime morale. A deal could leave him with what we’ve called the Michael Collins conundrum, in which a settlement based on compromise could create enough backlash to initiate either a civil war or a violent coup on behalf of even harder-line hardliners.

However, having established his bona fides for the last year under fire, Zelensky likely has a great deal of latitude at home, politically. He won’t be stupid enough to just accept a deal that leaves Ukraine without security guarantees from the West and Russia capable of rebuilding and returning, but he has some breathing room to engage in negotiations. And if Zelensky engages Xi in good faith, that may force Putin and Russia to compete in Beijing just to catch up. At the very least, it keeps Beijing from claiming that Zelensky won’t engage as a rationalization for large-scale arming of Russia in the conflict.

It also keeps his Western allies on the spot. If Zelensky’s willing to talk and Xi double-crosses him, it puts even more political pressure on Europe and the US to cut economic ties with Beijing, which no one really wants.

It’s a smart move, in other words, and likely a low-cost one at that. Zelensky hasn’t given up anything, and he’s managed to at least gain some space between Beijing and Moscow, briefly. That’s what Nixon did in 1972 as well.

Also: There’s a time factor in play for Russia in the desire to get weapons from China. Russia definitely has a materiel shortage issue, but they also have a manpower issue, and that’s getting worse even faster. Putin threw hundreds of thousands of new soldiers into the Donbas in an effort to reverse momentum, mainly without training, and it’s not working even where those new troops got concentrated most. ISW reports that the Russian offensive hasn’t gone much of anywhere in Donetsk, and even their claimed gains are at best incremental:

Russian forces continued offensive operations around Bakhmut on February 24. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces conducted unsuccessful offensive actions near Bakhmut; within 30km north of Bakhmut near Verkhnokamianske, Fedorivka, Rozdolivka, Dubovo-Vasylivka, Zaliznianske, and Berkhivka; and within 26km southwest of Bakhmut near Ivanivske, Chasiv Yar, Dyliivka, and Vasylivka.[34] Geolocated footage published on February 23 indicates that Russian forces likely made marginal advances near the E40 highway west of Paraskoviivka (7km north of Bakhmut).[35] Geolocated footage published on February 24 indicates that Wagner Group fighters likely advanced into the northern outskirts of Yahidne (2km north of Bakhmut).[36] Russian milbloggers claimed that Wagner Group fighters have taken control of most of Yahidne, although ISW has not observed visual confirmation that they have done so.[37] Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin also claimed that Wagner fighters completely captured Berkhivka (4km north of Bakhmut), although ISW has not observed visual confirmation of this claim.[38] Other Russian sources amplified Prigozhin’s claim, although a prominent milblogger stated that claims about the capture of Berkhivka are premature.[39] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces control elevated positions north of Dubovo-Vasylivka (6km northwest of Bakhmut) and attempted to advance towards Orikhovo-Vasylivka (11km northwest of Bakhmut).[40] A Russian milblogger claimed that Wagner Group fighters also conducted an offensive toward Vesele (17km northeast of Bakhmut) from Bilohorivka (21km northeast of Bakhmut).[41] Geolocated footage published on February 24 indicates that Russian forces likely secured marginal gains on the northeastern outskirts of Bakhmut.[42] A Russian milblogger claimed that positional battles are ongoing in Bakhmut and that Wagner fighters advanced in the eastern part and the southwestern outskirts of the city.[43] The Russian milblogger claimed that Wagner Group fighters resumed offensives in the direction of the T0504 highway and near Ivanivske (6km west of Bakhmut), where there is reportedly fighting on the outskirts of the settlement.[44]

Russian forces continued offensive operations along the western outskirts of Donetsk City on February 24. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces conducted unsuccessful offensive actions within 36km southwest of Avdiivka near Pervomaiske, Vodyane, Nevelske, Marinka, and Novomykhailivka.[45] Russian sources claimed that Russian forces conducted offensive operations near Pobieda (32km southwest of Avdiivka) and pushed Ukrainian forces out of strongholds in the settlement.[46] A prominent Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces lack the personnel needed to make advances around Pobieda.[47] A Russian source claimed that Russian forces advanced into Pobieda, although ISW has not seen any visual confirmation of Russian forces in the settlement.[48] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces conducted an assault toward Avdiivka from Spartak (5km south of Avdiivka) and from Novobakhmutivka (13km northeast of Avdiivka) towards Keramik (15km north of Avdiivka).[49]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in western Donetsk Oblast on February 24. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces conducted unsuccessful offensive actions near Prechystivka (35km southwest of Donetsk City).[50] Geolocated footage published on February 23 indicates that Russian forces likely secured marginal gains northeast of Mykilske (27km southwest of Donetsk City).[51] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces conducted assaults in the direction of Vuhledar (30km southwest of Donetsk City) from positions in the dacha area west of Mykilske.[52] Another Russian milblogger complained that Russian forces are inexplicably unable to destroy high-rise buildings in Vuhledar that reportedly offer Ukrainian forces effective observation positions for adjusting artillery fire around the settlement.[53]

With new influxes of superior materiel and a native force defending its own land at high morale, Ukraine has the upper hand on defense. If this goes on much longer, Russia won’t have enough soldiers left to effectively deploy whatever they get from China, assuming that they can even get the training to use it. Zelensky’s bid to engage Beijing could also allow him to run out the clock and force Putin to either call up a politically devastating wider mobilization or to start falling back to their own borders. And maybe Xi would prefer that to a Putin whose imperial ambitions have been achieved.