What could Alexander Lukashenko hope to gain by joining Vladimir Putin’s genocide in Ukraine — especially now? Despite owing his office (and likely his continued ability to breathe) to Putin, Lukashenko wisely demurred in February from tying his fate to the invasion when Lukashenko’s help might have contributed to the presumed quick victory of his patron. Even the hint of such cooperation in the war triggered sabotage and threats of rebellion against the teetering dictator in Belarus.

Events quickly vindicated Lukashenko as Putin’s military and commanders proved utterly incompetent. The war will shortly drag into its ninth month, and now Ukrainian forces have the momentum. So why at this moment has Lukashenko decided to involve Belarus militarily in the conflict?

For one thing, Lukashenko might be worried about a post-Putin order, just as Belarusian opposition leaders start to take hope in it:

Belarus’ opposition leader said Wednesday that she believes Russian military setbacks in Ukraine could shake the hold on power of Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko.

“We have a distracted Russia that is about to lose this war. It won’t be able to prop Lukashenko up with money and military support as in 2020,” said Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya, speaking at a security conference in Warsaw.

Call it a belated recollection on Lukashenko’s part of who props him up in Minsk. Maybe Lukashenko thought he could get off cheaply in this war without worrying about Putin’s status in Moscow, but suddenly that may be in play now, too. That could leave Lukashenko in a damned-if-you-do conundrum where he’s facing a revolt either way, and the least-worst option is to throw Putin a bone here and hope it doesn’t come to anything more than that.

It’s likely just for show, ISW concludes, as Belarus doesn’t really have a military to speak of. The Belarus army is more of an internal security force that keeps Lukashenko warmer than room temperature, and a screening defensive force which relies on the Russian army for expertise and direction for anything more. That should enough for a rational leader to keep them on the sidelines after watching the Russian army fall apart after first contact with what had been another defensive force.

Clearly, though, Putin has pressured Lukashenko into demonstrating a threat of action from the north, at least on the cheap. That might be enough to pull forces away from Ukraine’s counteroffensives in the south and southeast:

Russian and Belarusian forces remain unlikely to attack Ukraine from the north despite Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko’s October 10 announcement that Belarus and Russia agreed to deploy the Union State’s Regional Grouping of Forces (RGV) —a strategic formation of Russian and Belarusian units tasked with defending the Union State. Lukashenko stated that he and Russian President Vladimir Putin agreed on October 7 on an unspecified “deployment” of the Russian-Belarusian RGV in “connection with the escalation on the western borders of the Union State” but did not clearly define the deployment’s parameters.[14] Lukashenko stated that over a thousand Russian personnel will deploy to Belarus and that a Russian-Belarusian group began forming on October 8.[15] The Russian component of any RGV formations in Belarus will likely be comprised of low-readiness mobilized men or conscripts who likely will not pose a significant conventional military threat to Ukraine.

Those would be the lucky conscripts, who will likely see nothing but the Belarusian countryside. The less fortunate will go to Luhansk, Donetsk, and Kherson if they can manage to get there, and end up as cannon fodder in future Russian retreats. The Ukrainians aren’t impressed with the threat so far either:

The Russian component of the RGV is comprised of elements of the 1st Guard Tank Army, 20th Combined Arms Army, and airborne units– formations that have all sustained heavy combat losses in Ukraine and have a severely reduced combat capacity.[16] A Kyiv Post reporter claimed that Russian soldiers are deploying to Belarus en masse via cattle railcars without mechanized equipment on October 10—a characterization consistent with ISW’s assessment.[17] ISW has previously assessed that Ukrainian reports from late September of Belarus preparing to accept 20,000 mobilized Russian men indicate that Russia hopes to use Belarusian military facilities and infrastructure to hold and potentially train newly mobilized Russian forces, but that it remains exceedingly unlikely that these are leading indicators of imminent Belarusian involvement in Ukraine on Russia’s behalf.[18] The Kremlin may seek to use additional Russian forces in Belarus to fix Ukrainian forces near Kyiv and prevent their redeployment elsewhere to participate in counter-offensives. ISW has previously assessed that Lukashenko cannot afford the domestic ramifications of Belarusian involvement in Ukraine.[19] ISW also assesses that Russia does not have the ability to form a ground strike force from scratch or from existing units in Belarus quickly. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that it has not observed indicators of Russian forces forming offensive groups in Belarus and explicitly stated “there is no threat of an attack from the territory of the Republic of Belarus as of October 10.

Just because the Ukrainians are not impressed with the threat doesn’t mean they can ignore it altogether. They have to at least be prepared for yet another suicidal attempt to invade through the Chernobyl exclusion zone, which means the Ukrainians will have to keep some combat-ready forces and artillery there instead of on the southern fronts, where they can do more damage to Russians where it counts.

Where have we heard demands for a “second front” out of Moscow for a war they they wanted for territorial expansion before? Oh yeah. But just because its desperation is obvious doesn’t mean it can be entirely discounted either.

Even a phantom threat will still come at a cost to Lukashenko, though. Until now, the EU and the US have largely spared Belarus from the widespread sanctions aimed at Russia, but France and the EU warn that will change toute suite if Belarus begins offering military cooperation to Putin:

Foreign affairs spokesman Peter Stano told reporters in Brussels that the Commission “took note of the false accusations” which he branded “totally unfounded, ridiculous” and “utterly unacceptable.”

“Ukraine here is the victim. Ukraine is not the aggressor. And we remind the Belarusian regime that Ukraine is under brutal, illegal attack, which is in violation of the UN charter and in violation of international law. And we urge the regime in Minsk to refrain from any involvement of Belarus in this brutal, illegitimate undertaking.”

“And we also urge the regime in Minsk to immediately stop allowing the territory of Belarus to serve as a launchpad for air strikes, including the very recent missile strikes and drone attacks against Ukraine and the targets in Ukrainian territories,” he added. …

Asked about further sanctions against Russia, Stano stressed that if Belarus proceeds with the grouping of troops with Russia “this will be yet another escalation of this and this will not be unanswered from the side of the European Union.”

“Let me recall that all these steps, especially by the Belarusian regime, are against the will of the majority of the population and will be met with new and stronger restrictive measures from the side of the European Union,” he added.

Putin can sell sanctions as a great patriotic sacrifice to his subjects, or at least he could in the beginning. Lukashenko doesn’t have that kind of support in Belarus; he’s barely hung onto power even when Putin looked like the strongman of the East. If sanctions start biting in Belarus while Putin’s army continues to collapse, Lukashenko will shortly run out of places to hide — and suddenly Ukraine won’t be the only thorn in Moscow’s western side.