The Real Grid Crisis Is a State Policy Problem Dressed Up as a Market Failure

There's a critique of PJM making the rounds: PJM is too big. There are too many state interests at play, and PJM doesn’t have the ability to function cohesively or quickly enough. FERC even scheduled a governance technical conference this month to examine whether PJM's stakeholder structure can move fast enough to respond to demand. The reality is that policy disagreements at the state level are dressed up as a procedural defect with the grid, opening the way for critics to point their reforms at the wrong target.

Disagreements at the state level are just what you’d expect, pitting those that generate enough power to export against those that depend on imports. Pennsylvania is PJM’s energy workhorse, shipping out roughly a quarter of everything it generates. Illinois, West Virginia, and Michigan also produce more than they consume. The others – Virginia, Maryland, New Jersey, and Delaware – are net importers, and increasingly so as data centers expand across their footprints.

Exporters like Pennsylvania that are rich in nuclear, gas, and coal generation have fundamentally different interests in capacity pricing and transmission cost allocation from an importer state, which has restricted natural gas development, leaned hard into renewables, or joined an ambitious emission reduction program. When Virginia pulls in more expensive power from its neighbors, or when Maryland absorbs double-digit rate hikes, that isn’t a governance failure – it’s the market doing its job by revealing the cost of divergent state policy preferences (and thus resource access).

These state policy preferences are then lobbed at the market and its participants to respond to, whether by prematurely retiring generation, relying on tax subsidies, or simply building generation that is more expensive per megawatt when compared against traditional baseload fuels.