Russia Diminished?

On Saturday, May 9, Red Square was the scene of the traditional Victory Day parade to mark the most important date in recent Russian history. The “Great Fatherland War” (Великая Отечественная война, also translated as the “Great Patriotic War”) is the saga of heroism, sacrifice, survival, and renewal that provides today‘s post-Soviet Russia with the basis of its identity and unity. It is the one narrative that is capable of transcending old ideological divides. It alone can bring together anticommunist nationalists and diehard Soviet nostalgists.

It also provides an opportunity to demonstrate Russia’s military might. Not this year, however. The parade was devoid of tanks, trucks with missiles, and other lethal hardware. Russia’s Ministry of Defense said the reason was the “current operational situation,” while President Vladimir Putin’s press secretary, Dmitry Peskov, admitted that the decision was owing to the “terrorist threat” from Ukraine. In some regions of Russia, especially those more potentially vulnerable to drone attacks, the festivities have been canceled completely.

This is a remarkable and, for many Russians, sobering experience. Well into the fifth year of the“Special Military Operation” (Специальная военная операция), the country was forced to scale back its Victory Day commemoration—a clear sign that no victory is in sight. This was indirectly confirmed by Putin’s somewhat cryptic statement, after the parade, that “this matter” (the war in Ukraine) was “coming to an end.” It can only come to an end if Ukraine gives up—which is unlikely—or if Putin decides to end it, on terms which will fall far short of the originally stated goal of Ukraine’s disarmament and regime change in Kyiv.

If this is the case, it is almost certain that Putin will be rebuked by the government in Kyiv, and—far more importantly—by its chief backers in Western Europe, reflecting what historian John Mearshimer has called “the profound Russophobia that now pervades the West.” Ukraine backers are now prone to interpret any Russian conciliatory move as a sign of weakness, which demands refusal to normalize relations and ever greater firmness in pursuing the war until the big, bad bear is effectively defeated and declawed.