The Iran War Roils UK Politics

The UK may have chosen not to join the American-Israeli airstrikes on Iran, but it has not been able to escape the political fallout. The question of whether to intervene has proven agonizing for both the Labour government and its opponents on the right. It has also painfully exposed the limits of Britain’s power in the 21st century.

Keir Starmer’s decision before the bombing began not to allow the U.S. to use British airbases was initially seen as a product of the PM’s slavish devotion to international law (a hangover from his pre-parliamentary career as a human-rights barrister). Any pre-emptive action, UK government lawyers concluded, would be illegal unless Iran posed an “imminent” threat to Britain. The truth, it now seems, is more nuanced. Starmer reportedly made the case to his cabinet that, while the UK should not get involved in the war directly, it should allow the U.S. to use British bases, as this would help them hit their targets more quickly. He also felt it was important not to put unnecessary strain on the relationship with the Americans, or give the mercurial Trump any excuse to rip up recent U.S.-UK trade agreements.

But a weakened Starmer, who had just barely survived the scandalous appointment of a friend of Jeffrey Epstein as UK ambassador to Washington, failed to make this case to his cabinet. The “soft left” faction of his government, best represented by the Net Zero minister and former party leader Ed Miliband, urged against intervening—partly on pacifist grounds, citing the disasters of Iraq and Afghanistan; partly based on an intense dislike of Donald Trump; and most extraordinary of all, partly out of fears that it would upset British Muslims. 

In fact, only the day before the war began, Labour lost one of its safest parliamentary seats in a by-election in Greater Manchester. The Green Party pulled off a decisive victory by aggressively courting the Muslim bloc vote, including by producing campaign material in Urdu, the national language of Pakistan. Even before Labour’s bruising by-election defeat, the question of “Will it go down well with Muslims?” is now central to foreign-policy decisions. (A senior diplomat recently suggested Starmer’s recognition of a Palestinian state was driven by appeasement of Islamic sectarian voters.)