A Strategist in Waiting: Nathanael Greene at the Catawba River, February 1, 1781

The Race to the Dan is the name given to the campaign of maneuver and retreat that followed the Battle of Cowpens on January 17, 1781.[1] The major event in the campaign was the single confrontation of the opposing armies at the fords of the Catawba River on February 1. In the traditional view of the engagement at the Catawba, the American commander, Maj. Gen. Nathanael Greene, coldly committed the militia to a hopeless defense of the river while he quietly extricated his Continentals from danger. An examination of the traditional view of the battle and Greene’s conduct in dealing with his militia subordinates suggests a different interpretation.

Brig. Gen. Daniel Morgan had defeated a detachment of 1,000 British soldiers at the Battle of Cowpens. Morgan realized he did not muster the strength to contest the main British army under Lt. Gen. Charles Cornwallis that was waiting nearby. Morgan took his 1,000 men and 600 British prisoners north, then northeast, ultimately heading for safety and supplies in Virginia.

Rivers, swollen in the winter rains, were obstacles to movement for both armies. Morgan divided his force into two, one assigned the mission of managing the prisoners, the other containing most of his fighting men.[2] The two divisions, small and nimble, crossed the South Fork of the Catawba River, then paused at the main branch of the Catawba. Cornwallis, his army reinforced with 1,500 men, was slow to start and moved more ponderously. He stopped at Ramsour’s Mill on the South Fork to burn most of his wagons in an effort to pare down the plodding, elephantine nature of his large force.

At the outset of the campaign, Greene was camped near Cheraw, South Carolina. He was new to command, having arrived on December 3 to take over the southern department of the Continental army.[3] He chafed at inaction, and yearned for his chance at Cornwallis, then resting securely at his base in Winnsboro, South Carolina. The Race to the Dan was a stream arising from several wells. One was Cornwallis’s decision to pursue the retreating Morgan, motivated in part, at least, by his desire to recover the British soldiers captured at Cowpens. A second was Greene’s intention to fight Cornwallis.[4] Greene had recently served in the north as a staff officer to George Washington, and longed to earn his spurs in independent command.