The Unraveling of China's Coercive Nationalism

A new round of retaliatory measures by Beijing against Japan has been set in motion following remarks by Japan’s prime minister on the possibility of a “Taiwan contingency.” In commenting that a crisis in the Taiwan Strait would not be a purely regional matter but one with direct implications for Japan’s security - and by extension for the broader international community - the Japanese leader reaffirmed Tokyo’s long-standing concern that peace and stability across the Strait are inseparable from Japan’s own national interests. Beijing interpreted these remarks as an infringement on what it defines as its core sovereignty claims, responding with a familiar playbook of diplomatic pressure, economic signaling, and nationalist mobilization.

Nationalism once again serves as the central narrative justifying China’s retaliation. Yet beneath its surface coherence, this strategy is showing growing strain. What had long functioned as a low-cost, high-impact tool of coercion is increasingly evolving into a high-friction, selectively applied risk mechanism - one that not only complicates China’s external diplomacy but also threatens to rebound inward, exacerbating social fatigue, economic anxiety, and ideological dissonance at home.

Within China, public fatigue with - and growing skepticism toward - the political manipulation of nationalism is increasingly evident. This shift is reflected in the large number of Chinese citizens who, despite repeated official “advice” to the contrary, continue to travel to Japan; in the spontaneous gatherings of fans outside the abruptly canceled Shanghai concert of Ayumi Hamasaki, as well as in her decision to perform in the empty venue; and in clusters of posts and replies on Douyin declaring sentiments such as “If Taiwan is in trouble, the Chinese people are in trouble,” and “Always stand with the people of Taiwan against the real enemy.” Statistics from the Japan National Tourism Organization reinforce this pattern: even after Beijing introduced a series of retaliatory measures against Japan, the number of Chinese tourists traveling there continued to rise sharply in November.

While state-led nationalism has long dominated China’s official discourse, it has never been uniformly accepted or fully internalized across society. Forms of quiet skepticism, selective disengagement, and private resistance have persisted for decades, constrained by political risk but sustained by personal experience and pragmatic calculation. The recent public and highly symbolic developments therefore do not represent a sudden emergence of anti-nationalist sentiment, but rather the surfacing and intensification of long-standing undercurrents now finding more visible expression.