Proposals for a Ukraine peace deal that accept Russian territorial gains repeat the old pattern of great powers dividing weaker states. It is a pattern set in the partitions of Poland in 1795 and revived in 1939. For Ukraine and its neighbours, these historical memories make any land-for-peace formula look less like conflict resolution and more like the start of another imposed partition.
Echoes of 1795 shape regional distrust, especially when talk of freezing the conflict risks rewarding aggression. Broken commitments such as the Budapest Memorandum deepen Ukraine’s fear that great-power guarantees fail when they’re needed most.
Durable security in Europe depends on recognising that states such as Ukraine cannot be treated as territory to be rearranged by outside powers.
The urgency of this argument lies in the present. As discussion turns again to negotiations, ceasefires and interim settlements, the central question is not whether war should end, but on what terms and with what consequences. In Central and Eastern Europe, proposals that validate Russia’s seizure of land are read through a long historical record in which peace was achieved by dismemberment, legality was manufactured after the fact, and the affected state was excluded from decisions about its own future.
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