For Hezbollah, these are trying times. After decades of being Lebanon’s predominant political and military organization, the group is reeling. During a yearlong war with Israel, it lost much of its military infrastructure. Its leadership ranks were decimated. Battered by conflict, in November, it signed a cease-fire agreement with Israel and pulled its forces from Lebanon’s south—Hezbollah’s traditional domain. Not long after, Bashar al-Assad’s regime fell in Syria, severing supply lines between the organization and Iran, its primary patron. Now Hezbollah is also at risk of losing the support of Lebanese Shiites, who make up its domestic base.

As is usually the case, Hezbollah’s loss is Lebanon’s gain. In fact, the group’s deterioration is giving Lebanese officials a once-in-a-lifetime opportunity to reassert their presence and restore their failed state. At least some of Lebanon’s leaders seem ready to take advantage. Newly elected President Joseph Aoun, the former commander of the Lebanese armed forces, has said that government troops will move back into southern towns. He has promised that Hezbollah will finally disarm, becoming a normal political party rather than a shadow state with a full-blown military. The parliament’s newly elected prime minister, Nawaf Salam, has also promised to disarm Hezbollah and reestablish the Lebanese state’s authority. Together, Aoun and Salam could usher in a new era for their country and its long-suffering residents.

But although Hezbollah is down, it is not out. The group and its allies currently control 53 seats in Lebanon’s 128-member parliament, enough to sway important decisions. If they can work with the Druze leader Walid Jumblatt’s Democratic Gathering bloc and former Prime Minister Saad Hariri’s National Moderation party, they will have a majority of seats. The group can physically attack or threaten representatives who do not follow their wishes, as well as other domestic actors who stand in their way. No one should be surprised if Hezbollah resorts to such intimidation. If it has any hope of rebuilding, the group will need control of the state.

Aoun, Salam, and their allies can prevent Hezbollah from gaining the upper hand. But they will need to move quickly, while the organization is still dazed. They will have to make sure that Lebanon’s independent institutions, not Hezbollah’s, are in charge of rebuilding the country’s south. They will need a cabinet, central bank, and judiciary that are not beholden to the group. And they will need parliament to finally make clear that Hezbollah has no role in defending the country. If they succeed, Hezbollah might receive an electoral drubbing in the May 2026 parliamentary elections, sending it into a tailspin. But if they fail, the group will start to regenerate.