My main point today is that leverage exists independent of the debt limit: Republicans control one house of Congress, and bills to fund government operations next year can’t pass without their consent. They are free to tie demands to the passage of those bills — including demands about mandatory spending or other policies not directly addressed in appropriations bills.

So on one hand, the fight over the debt limit is very important: If the debt limit doesn’t get raised in time, we may face an economic crisis associated with a default on government bonds. On the other hand, the fight over the debt limit isn’t important at all: If it’s removed as a lever, Republicans still retain the ability to force Democrats to the table to cut spending. This redundancy is the reason that debt limit increases so often are tied to agreements over spending. As I’ve written repeatedly, it’s not true that “negotiating over the debt limit” was an aberration in 2011. It’s happened repeatedly since 1985; it just doesn’t stick out in memory because we’ve rarely gotten so close to default as we did in 2011, and most of those negotiations are just remembered as budget negotiations.

This is why I’m eager for the fiscal negotiation to start: It has to happen sooner or later, and it can help bring the necessary debt limit increase along.

[I agree with Josh that the debt limit as a separate issue is, well, *stupid*. Congress authorizes borrowing in the budget process, and the artificial debt limit is redundant. On the other hand, treating it as some sort of sacrosanct issue on which no one can negotiate is equally if not more stupid. Since when is public policy on spending immune from dissent and debate? Let’s just get it over with, and maybe later address the stupidity of the redundant debt ceiling apart from normal budgeting. — Ed]