To demonstrate why there is so little chance for this offensive to succeed, we will conduct a mental exercise to illustrate the compounding levels of difficulty. For the purposes of all that follow, let us for the moment say that somehow Ukraine was able to overcome every obstacle I articulated in my previous work that would be necessary even to launch the operation (marshaling sufficient manpower, tanks, air power, ammunition and other supplies necessary to sustain combat operations). Launching the offensive will only be the first of several monumental task.
Miracle #1: Russia Doesn’t Make Adjustments to the Offensive
One of the errors many analysts make in assessing Ukraine’s chances of successfully retaking Kherson is the usually unstated assumption that the current dynamics will continue to exist throughout the operation. For example, Ukraine has had some successes of late in interdicting Russian ammunition depots and damaging bridges over the Dnipro river with HIMARS rocket launchers. The hope is that Ukraine can block Russia’s ability to resupply its forces on the western side of the Dnipro, isolating the defenders.
Further, there is the unstated assumption that the number of troops Russia has allocated for the Kherson mission will remain static, even if Ukraine starts to have success. That will almost certainly not be the case. Putin knows how big of a blow it would be to his war if his forces lost Kherson. Thus far, Putin has avoided the politically risky move of putting his country on a full mobilized footing, choosing to keep life as normal as possible for the majority of Russia’s population.
But if his choice becomes having to take a political risk with his population or to lose a major battle, it is a virtual certainty Putin will order a mobilization and bring in as many troops as is necessary to prevent the loss of Kherson.
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