In the past few years, Russian military manuals have outlined a strategy of “escalate to de-escalate.” A possible scenario: NATO and Russia are fighting a conventional war; NATO is winning; Russia tries to tip the balance (“escalate”) by firing off a small number of low-yield nuclear weapons, probably against concentrations of NATO troops or munitions. (“Low-yield” is a relative term: the smallest nukes in the U.S. and Russian arsenals are about the same size as the A-bomb that leveled Hiroshima at the end of World War II; most of them are thousands of times more powerful.) The hope would be that the U.S. President would halt the war (“de-escalate”), fearing that if he responded by firing off nuclear weapons, Russia would fire off more. (The Pentagon cited this hypothetical several years ago to make the case for buying new low-yield nuclear weapons, so we could respond to this Russian tactic without escalating the fight too much. Some of these warheads are now loaded on the missiles in the Navy’s Trident submarines)
Is this scenario a bit loony? Welcome to Nuclear Strategy 201. It all looks loony from a few steps back; but up close, it has a certain logic. And if someone with his finger on the button believes in the logic, well, that’s all it takes to make it real.
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