The natural question is how China missed all the signs and made such a strategic misjudgment. Other than an intelligence failure, there are potentially two causes: China’s speculation of Russian behavior through its own lens and Putin’s manipulation.

The Chinese didn’t have to believe the American intelligence, but they certainly had their own satellites to show the troop movements along the Ukraine border. What most likely went wrong is that the Chinese assessment of Russian intentions was based on China’s own military philosophy. For Beijing, “winning without fighting” is the ultimate art of war. According to Sun Tzu’s teachings, the best military operations ranked are: undermining the enemy’s plans, then diplomacy, then defeating the enemy on the battlefield (上兵伐谋，其次伐交，其次伐兵，其下攻城). An invasion to take over territory is the least desirable. That’s why coercion is such a preferred strategy for Beijing, which in the Chinese view comes with elegance and effectiveness. For China, the positioning of Russian troops already had Ukraine cornered, and the natural next step would be to bargain from a position of strength. It is simply inexplicable for the Chinese that Russia would launch a full invasion in Ukraine when it already had the upper hand.

Other than this “mirror image bias,” the Chinese were also played by Russia. As manifested by the February 4 Joint Statement, the Russians had exhaustively and repeatedly explained their grievances over the expansion of NATO and that Russia had to take actions to address its “reasonable security concerns.” The Chinese position in the Joint Statement suggested its support of these two Russian positions. But as argued above, the Chinese did not expect a full Russian invasion, and they thought China would at most have to stand with Russia for its bluffing and coercion. As such, the understanding and support China rendered were qualified in the Chinese view and not meant to be a blank check for Russia to invade.