What’s more, China’s aging population will slow growth as its workforce becomes less productive. The impending ‘aging’ crisis has already dawned on the Chinese government. In 2015 the 30-year-long ‘one-child’ policy became the ‘two-child’ policy and this year became the ‘three-child’ policy. Notwithstanding these changes, the undoubted advances made in China’s technology sectors, and the shift to domestic demand led growth, it seems inevitable that China’s economic growth will fall to 1 to 3 percent annually over the next 20 years. In the future, China’s economic growth will depend on increasing labor productivity. There is considerable scope for this. But productivity is highly dependent on efficient capital allocation. Xi’s government has failed to address the sclerotic structure of China’s banking system, which will restrict China’s growth potential. Far from the Communist party being ‘the crux upon which the interests and wellbeing of all Chinese people depend’ as Xi described it last week, China’s economy has achieved its exceptional performance since Deng Xiaoping’s reforms in spite of the Communist party and not because of it.