On the other side, hawks sometimes make a case grounded in the geopolitics of Central Asia, one that treats the benefits to Kabul’s residents as ancillary. Sometimes this is found in the need to prevent the Taliban from making Afghanistan a safe haven for terrorists, a noble goal. But just as often, hawks frankly admit that the aims of our presence in Afghanistan are no longer just smashing up al-Qaeda and punishing the Taliban — goals that were arguably achieved 18 years ago. Instead we remain in Afghanistan because Bagram Air Base is good to have. Potential conflicts with Iran, Russia, or China require holding on to this bit of real estate. The cost of doing so is low. Perhaps $20 billion a year. No American troops have died in a year. This argument is more likely to appeal to Cold Warriors who care about China but are otherwise reluctant about nation building. But, it also doesn’t quite add up. There are many parts of the Afghan countryside where the Taliban acts with impunity even now, and could set up a safe haven for al-Qaeda. (Frankly, if you want the best training al-Qaeda can offer, Idlib province in Syria, filled with former and potential future U.S. clients, is probably a better bet.) Smashing the Taliban’s capacity to host or train terrorists would require something much more dramatic than an ongoing presence in Kabul. It would require something like regime change in Pakistan, the U.S.’s traditional vassal in the region, which sponsors the Taliban, and which hosted Osama bin Laden for years.