Is political decay inevitable?

Good things produce bad things; bad things produce good things. China produced an effective state bureaucracy 2,200 years ago and Prussia in the 18th century because they faced aggressive neighbors and needed to fund a competent military. That gave them rule by law, but not a rule of law capable of binding emperor or Kaiser or Führer.

Democratic accountability grew in Britain’s distant North American colonies and flowered in a republic, with a Constitution and courts imposing the rule of law and legislatures establishing democratic accountability through universal (white) manhood suffrage. But the young republic’s political patronage system meant that America lacked an effective state bureaucracy until the Progressive reforms of the early 20th century.

Moreover, there is the possibility — probability, likelihood, certainty — of decay. Fukuyama is disappointed that the U.S. Forest Service, his paragon of (large-P) Progressive bureaucracy, has decayed because of contradictory congressional commands and court mandates. Too much democracy and rule of law make for an ineffective state.

But there’s a bigger problem here. Fukuyama compares Progressive bureaucracy with Taylorite management of assembly lines. Neither factory workers nor bureaucrats are automata. They work better when they have discretion.