A Shi’a region would also be problematic, prone to becoming a rump client state of Iran. Indeed, for comparison, one should note how Iran has already long sought to build its influence on pro-autonomy trends in Basra, the Shia stronghold an port city in Iraq’s south. In Basra, Iranian proxy militias such as Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq, became entrenched and untouchable powers over the course of 2012 and 2013.

In any case, just as the majority of the Sunni insurgent groups ultimately seek the overthrow of the central government, Shi’a factions in a divided state would pursue the same restoration of national power. Regardless of Iranian influence, Shia groups in Iraq still believe in a concept of Iraqi nationalism. Such groups would not be satisfied with having their power limited to Shi’a-dominated southern areas and would strive to reunify the country under their own rule.

Besides, the model of a Sunni-Shi’a partition would still leave unsolved the many ethnically mixed Sunni-Shi’a areas of Diyala (where a Kurdish component is also notable) and Salah ad-Din provinces, unless one wishes to posit a substantial amount of ethnic cleansing in these places.