Some Taliban getting pretty tired of Al Qaeda

The awful part is this: many of Omar’s followers desperately wish they knew how to get rid of their so-called allies in al Qaeda. It’s true that senior Taliban commanders often value the group’s tactical and technical advice, and they respect its strict ideology and unflinching determination. “The Taliban is still technically dependent on al Qaeda for making bombs and IEDs and planning sophisticated attacks, particularly in the cities,” says a senior adviser to Afghan President Hamid Karzai. But on the whole, the jihadi group’s surviving members are more of a liability than an asset to the Afghan insurgents, constantly depending on them for protection and sustenance.

Most Taliban commanders and fighters inside Afghanistan would be only too glad to see the last of bin Laden’s men. Drone attacks and relentless pursuit by U.S. forces have reduced the foreign jihadis’ presence to small roving bands of seven to 10 Arabs and Pakistanis, mostly from the tribal areas, as well as a few from the Punjab. But those remnants continue to pose nothing but trouble for their Afghan hosts, behaving almost as if they want to antagonize everyone in sight. Among other things, the hardline Wahhabis have a habit of mocking local customs as supposedly un-Islamic and of preventing villagers from praying at the shrines of Sufi saints. “They insult villagers by calling them pagans and ‘polytheist Muslims,’” says a Taliban commander in Ghazni province…

Similar problems have plagued Abdul Qayyum, a Taliban commander in neighboring Paktika province. About two months ago Qayyum asked the al Qaeda fighters embedded in his area to head back to Pakistan, saying the local resistance no longer needed their help. They refused to leave. “You can’t stop us from jihad in Afghanistan,” the jihadi group’s leader told the Taliban commander. Tensions between the insurgents and al Qaeda are running dangerously high, Qayyum says: “These Arab jihadists do not care for their own lives and the lives of others. With talk of peace and breaking with al Qaeda, these guys don’t trust us anymore.” At night the al Qaeda fighters insist on posting their own sentries rather than relying on Qayyum’s men for security. “They even sleep with one finger on the trigger of their AK-47s,” he adds. He says he has written letters to the Taliban’s Pakistan-based ruling council, the Quetta Shura, requesting advice and intercession, but so far he’s had no luck. “No one has replied,” Qayyum says. “They are also afraid of al Qaeda.”