The Libyan non-model

3. Lead from behind? In theory, supplying the wherewithal to remove Qaddafi while denying just that fact offered a few quirky advantages. Our NATO allies liked the façade of appearing as major military players, while we avoided knee-jerk anti-Americanism. It is hard to ignore the natural law that the strongest military usually exercises the greatest postwar influence. But we did not exercise such influence, and we now learn that our interests may not be the same as those whom we led from behind. We had few oil and gas interests in Libya, at least in comparison to France and Britain. As in the Lockerbie bomber’s repatriation, our anti-terrorism interests are not always identical with those of our allies. The result was confusion both at home and abroad. To this day, the American public does not know the degree to which American supplies and planes led to Qaddafi’s removal. It does not understand the logic of using NATO allies as fig leaves. And the cute phrase “lead from behind” not only is an oxymoron, but cannot be repeated with Syria or Iran. In short, outsourcing high-profile air power to our allies works only when the enemy has no air force…

And sometimes there are no good choices. Take Syria. We have only three choices, all of them sort of bad. We can ignore the bloodshed, assume such is the way of all tribal regimes, hope for the best, and prepare for the worst by ensuring the violence does not spread to our allies. Or we can try to convince the Assad regime of our good intentions and hope it reforms; that was the reasoning behind our recent policy of reopening our embassy and having the secretary of state dub Bashir Assad a “reformer.” Or we can intervene openly through air power or stealthily through arms sales on the premise that what follows Assad won’t be worse.