Libya's coming insurgency

Should Qaddafi hang on to power and the coming insurgency pit anti-government rebels against his regime, the United States would first have to decide whether it sought to pressure both sides toward a negotiated solution (something unlikely to happen until they have fought long enough to conclude that outright victory was unlikely) or whether it wanted a rebel victory. If a negotiated settlement was the goal, the United States and its allies would need to provide assistance, advice, and training to the rebels, both to prevent their defeat and to encourage them to avoid attacking civilians and to reject extremists. If a rebel victory was the goal, this sort of help would need to be even more extensive.

If the insurgency involved a new government fighting against Qaddafi loyalists, the United States and its allies would need to provide extensive counterinsurgency training and advice to the security forces. After all, even veterans of Qaddafi’s military have little background in this, particularly in a type of counterinsurgency that seeks to protect rather than target the civilian population. Without support from and dependency on outsiders, the new government’s security forces would probably undertake a brutal, “mailed fist” counterinsurgency campaign. This might attain Washington’s goal of a consolidation of power by anti-Qaddafi forces but not the second objective of limiting the impact on the Libyan people. The more involved outside supporters and advisers, the greater the chances that the brutality of the counterinsurgency can be controlled to some degree.