Blah blah blah. Vladimir Putin showed no sign of coming off message in his address on the anniversary of the invasion of Ukraine. He also showed no sign of remorse or even original thought.

In a speech clearly intended to resonate with the Russians’ cultural mix of imperialism and paranoia, Putin insisted that the West have been the aggressors and that Putin’s invasion was in fact a defense of the motherland. “We aren’t fighting the Ukrainian people,” Putin said while spending the past year volleying missiles at their cities:

Russian President Vladimir Putin accused Western countries Tuesday of igniting and sustaining the war in Ukraine, refusing any blame for Moscow almost a year after the Kremlin’s invasion of its neighbor that has killed tens of thousands of people.

In his long-delayed state-of-the-nation address, Putin cast his country — and Ukraine — as victims of Western double-dealing and said it was Russia, not Ukraine, fighting for its very existence.

“We aren’t fighting the Ukrainian people,” Putin said in a speech days before the war’s first anniversary on Friday. Ukraine “has become hostage of the Kyiv regime and its Western masters, which have effectively occupied the country.”

The speech reiterated a litany of grievances that the Russian leader has frequently offered as justification for the widely condemned war while vowing no military let-up in Ukrainian territories he has illegally annexed, apparently rejecting any peace overtures in a conflict that has reawakened fears of a new Cold War.

One has to wonder whether the Russians can see through these shabby lies, especially about not “fighting the Ukrainian people.” Almost a year ago, Putin defended the invasion on the basis that there is no such thing as a Ukrainian person. At the time, as well as before and after, Putin argued that Ukraine was in fact Russian and all of its inhabitants were Russian:

But in waging war on Ukraine, President Vladimir V. Putin of Russia has been driven by a different concept, ethno-nationalism. It is an idea of nationhood and identity based on language, culture and blood — a collectivist ideology with deep roots in Russian history and thought.

Mr. Putin has repeatedly asserted that Ukraine is not a real state and that the Ukrainians are not a real people, but actually Russian, part of a Slavic heartland that also includes Belarus.

“Putin wants to consolidate the civilizational border of Russia, as he calls it, and he is doing that by invading a sovereign European country,” said Ivan Vejvoda, a senior fellow at the Institute of Human Sciences in Vienna.

In this sense, argues Ivan Krastev, the war is one of recolonization, capturing lands ruled by the Russian empire and the Soviet Union. “Even if Ukraine were autocratic, it would not be tolerated by Putin,” he said. “He’s reconsolidating imperial nationalism.’’

The New York Times linked a July 2021 article written by Putin to underscore the point. In it Putin called back to “Ancient Rus,” and insisted that all Slavic peoples descended from it — and that meant that they all answer to Moscow to this day:

To have a better understanding of the present and look into the future, we need to turn to history. Certainly, it is impossible to cover in this article all the developments that have taken place over more than a thousand years. But I will focus on the key, pivotal moments that are important for us to remember, both in Russia and Ukraine.

Russians, Ukrainians, and Belarusians are all descendants of Ancient Rus, which was the largest state in Europe. Slavic and other tribes across the vast territory – from Ladoga, Novgorod, and Pskov to Kiev and Chernigov – were bound together by one language (which we now refer to as Old Russian), economic ties, the rule of the princes of the Rurik dynasty, and – after the baptism of Rus – the Orthodox faith. The spiritual choice made by St. Vladimir, who was both Prince of Novgorod and Grand Prince of Kiev, still largely determines our affinity today.

The throne of Kiev held a dominant position in Ancient Rus. This had been the custom since the late 9th century. The Tale of Bygone Years captured for posterity the words of Oleg the Prophet about Kiev, ”Let it be the mother of all Russian cities.“

In the article, Putin goes into excruciating historical detail to attempt to convince people that a 1654 letter to Moscow is somehow determinative rather than the clear will of the people who live in Ukraine now — and whose sovereignty Russia recognized for over thirty years before the invasion. And the argument is not limited to Ukraine, either; Putin argues that Lithuania and Poland are part of the “Ancient Rus” construct, as well as all Slavic people. That makes clear Putin’s ambitions in the Baltic States as well as in the Balkans.

For the most part, though, Putin focused on Moscow’s claims to Ukraine and his patronizing approach to the latter. “For we are one people,” he argued, but also that “what Ukraine will be — it is up to its citizens to decide.” Clearly, Putin had assumed that most Ukrainians thought of themselves as Russians and only needed a push to “decide” for a joyful return in an Anschluss. And just as clearly, a year of watching Ukrainians fight to repel Putin’s invading and ravaging hordes hasn’t disabused Putin of his ethnocentric fantasies about “Ancient Rus” and the primacy of Moscow as the only legitimate leader of all Slavs.

So today’s speech was nothing new, nor should we have expected it to be. If Putin had actually learned anything, he’d be withdrawing from Ukraine rather than throwing more cannon fodder into the battles. Putin has instead mobilized and deployed hundreds of thousands of replacements, but the impact of those new forces has been negligible at best.

At the same time, infighting between the professional Russian army and two private armies is creating a conflict within Russian ranks, reports ISW, and it’s become even worse with the attempted assimilation of proxy militias in Luhansk and Donetsk:

The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) confirmed the formal integration of the Donetsk and Luhansk People’s Republics’ (DNR/LNR) militias into the Russian Armed Forces on February 19 in response to growing criticism about reported command changes within the proxy units. The Russian MoD denied reports about the alleged dismissal of officers of the integrated DNR and LNR’s 1st and 2nd Army Corps, likely in response to widespread milblogger and proxy criticisms about the reported dismissal of DNR Militia Spokesman Eduard Basurin on February 17.[9] Basurin discussed his dismissal in a publicized meeting with Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin on February 19 in which he stated that such command changes will “harm” proxy commanders and servicemen.[10] Basurin noted that servicemen in occupied Donetsk Oblast trust their commanders and would be demoralized if those commanders were replaced by people they did not know. Basurin stated that it is important to warn about ongoing command changes and questioned who would be defending Russia if the newly integrated proxy units refuse to fight as a result of the Russian professionalization effort.

The decision to reorganize the DNR and LNR militias amid an ongoing offensive likely indicates that the Russian MoD does not fully grasp the scale of the underlying challenges of integrating irregular forces into the professional military, especially during a period of intense combat operations. The DNR and LNR forces are currently fighting in Donbas in support of Russia’s goal to reach the administrative borders of Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts and such untimely restructuring of the command structure may reduce cohesion within the proxy units and between them and Russian forces. Russian forces have suffered from their own shortcomings in unit cohesion and will likely face greater tensions with the proxy militias that were not trained to professional standards. Proxy elements have also repeatedly complained about receiving unequal treatment from the Kremlin, and Russian mobilized servicemen have recently accused the DNR and LNR formations of abuse and discrimination in turn.[11] This reorganization may upset and demoralize proxy elements that have enjoyed a great deal of independence as irregular militants for nine years and may risk alienating them amidst the offensive for Donbas. Russia needs DNR and LNR units—which have not been historically effective forces—to maintain positions in western Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts as conventional Russian troops pursue an offensive on select frontlines in eastern Ukraine.

Worth noting: Chechen warlord Ramzan Kadyrov is now trying to compete with Yevgeny Prigozhin’s Wagner Group for favor in Putin’s court. That battle has now involved the Ministry of Defense, all of whom are competing for Putin’s favor — as well as primacy when Putin either dies or gets ousted, or both at the same time. Putin’s July 2021 essay notably never includes the Chechens as a descendant of “Ancient Rus,” which makes their inclusion look somewhat odd in an imperial war based on an ethnocentric argument.

It’s yet another indicator that what Putin really wants is empire on the cheap to the extent that he can get it. Today’s speech is all about Putin’s anger at the surprise that the Ukrainians are making him pay dearly for it, and that the West hasn’t been cowed into appeasement yet.