In this case, the video serves as just an appetizer to the commentary Michael delivers in his post. As Washington debates over Gen. Stanley McChrystal’s cri de coeur for more resources and a deeper commitment to the fight in the Af-Pak theater, Michael underscores the necessity for focus on the war, as opposed to, say, a sports event that won’t take place for another seven years. We’re losing men on the lines, and we need to decide whether they’re sacrificing for a mission we think worth fighting:

We need more gear and more forces now. We can outfight these enemies and we can win the war, but at this rate a favorable outcome is difficult to imagine. This war shows signs that it will become more intense than Iraq at its peak. As with my twelve dispatches from 2006 warning that we were losing this war, the warnings over the past couple of years seem to be falling on incredulous ears. We will lose the war unless we get more troops and more gear soon.

This weekend we lost eight more soldiers in a firefight. I learned about it while they were still fighting, but did not report it until just before the media broke the story the next day. Still unreported, to my knowledge, sources tell me that FOB Keating was destroyed and that troops were under siege for up to 24 hours before Air Force Para-rescue got them out. (Subject to confirmation.) The fighting will only intensify. We can beat these guys, but not under current conditions.

I have not yet heard that we lost that base in the firefight. If so, that’s a blow to our operations against the Taliban. Global Security describes its position and its utility in the war:

Forward Operating Base Keating is located in the Nuristan Province of Easern Afghanistan, about 15 miles from the Pakistani border. As of March, 2008 it was a small outpost home to Bravo Troop, 1st Squadron, 91st Cavalry Regiment, 173rd Airborne Brigade Combat Team.

FOB Keating and the 1-91 also oversaw Combat Outpost (called COP’s) Warheit, a satellite outpost of Keating that is about a three and a half hour hike up the mountain. Small outposts like Warheit are usually home to one or two platoons of soldiers from the ANA and U.S. Military and are usually set up in very remote areas to watch for any increases in Taliban activity.

In the vicinity of FOB Keating and COP Warheit Bravo Company and the ANA were also attempting to keep the peace between the villages of Nagar, Papristan, Jimjuz, Binuz, upper and lower Kamidesh. Those villages had been fighting amongst each other long before coalition forces entered the area.

A stronger presence could have held the position, and its loss — if indeed it is lost — makes it more difficult to gather intel on Taliban operations in the area. Without a presence that can be defended against this kind of attack, the locals will have little incentive to work with Coalition forces to stop Taliban raids and will have to start cutting deals with the people who can hold the ground in that area.

Be sure to read all of Michael’s reports, and to drop a few dollars into his tip jar. It keeps Michael reporting from the front lines, where we need his independent voice more than ever.