Ash Carter is right: Russia doesn’t deserve a sphere of influence

Newly confirmed Defense Sec. Ashton Carter is a promising figure. Enthusiasm for his tenure in the Pentagon should perhaps be tempered, though, by the fact that he will serve as a member of President Barack Obama’s Cabinet.

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In a document prepared for the Senate Armed Service Committee, Carter outlined his thinking on a variety of issues relating to pressing international security threats. On the subject of Russia and the irredentist elements apparently driving policy inside the Kremlin, Carter had some refreshing comments.

“I reject the notion that Russia should be afforded a ‘sphere of influence,'” Carter wrote. “If confirmed, I will continue to encourage US partners, such as Moldova, Georgia, and Ukraine, to build their security capacity and military interoperability with NATO.”

Those who study Russia will acknowledge that Moscow has some historic security considerations that are indelible features of its approach to foreign affairs. Russia’s experience in the 19th and 20th Centuries has led Moscow to believe that a certain amount of “strategic depth,” in which buffer states can absorb hostile invasion forces from the West, is critical. Since Catherine II, Russian leaders have coveted the Black Sea coast and are more than willing to expend Russian blood and treasure to secure it.

These considerations have led many to contend that Russia’s prosecution of what may eventually come to be known as the Second Crimean War, presuming it remains geographically contained, is merely a reflection of Moscow’s unchanging geostrategic priorities. In that sense, some might even claim that Russian aggression is justified.

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But this is a delusion. Russia’s desire for “strategic depth” is an antiquated notion. Even if it were not, Russia lacks the political or military clout to secure a buffer zone in the absence of Western complicity. In order to thwart the self-determination of those former Soviet Republics and Eastern Bloc states which are desirous of further integration with the West, Russia engages in political destabilization, the issuing of ultimatums, and “maskirovka.”

To the extent that Russia defines access to the Black Sea as critical, it might have been content to continue to lease a naval base in the Crimean city of Sevastopol. Russia’s paranoid fear that the collapse of the Yanukovych government would have threatened its access to this base in no way justifies the invasion and annexation of sovereign European territory – the first of its kind since Stalin absorbed Transcarpathia in 1945.

If a naked power calculation were applied to the region, the degree to which Western powers defer to Russian concerns would appear wholly unjustified. Russia’s gross domestic product is roughly equal to Italy’s. The formerly petrodollar-fueled nation has been crippled by reduced crude prices and, in conjunction with Western sanctions, the federation’s economy is spiraling toward recession.

Militarily, Russia maintains the largest force in the region, but the Russian Army is a mere shadow of the Red Army. “The Russian army is at about 285,000, including conscripts, but units are being manned at 40 to 60 percent, according to the Swedish study,” The Washington Post’s Walter Pincus reported last year. “Contract soldiers, who must serve three years, have not been reenlisting at expected rates, and the dropouts run from 35 percent to 80 percent, the Swedish study said.” The army’s logistical capabilities are hindered by corruption. Russia’s fleet of combat-ready aircraft is declining. The project of updating the Russian Army’s mechanized units that began many months ago has largely stalled.

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That does not mean that Russia is a paper tiger. In his report, Pincus concluded that the decrepit state of the Russian military indicated to him that Vladimir Putin would decline to invade eastern Ukraine. He was wrong.

The French Revanchists’ experience taught the world that a nation’s ambition often outstrips its capabilities. The nationalistic desire to reclaim the territories lost to Germany in the Franco-Prussian War led many to not only welcome but to celebrate the end of La Belle Époque and the onset of a war that would claim 16 million lives. In their quest to again impose servility on portions of Europe, Russian leaders seem as inclined as were their French counterparts to invite another great war. It goes without saying that this irresponsible aspiration should be opposed, but how to go about opposing it is vexing.

Russia does not deserve a “sphere of influence,” and America’s status as sole global hegemon should be leveraged in every way possible to prevent the rise of regional dominions and satellite states. There are both hard and soft power components to this strategy (Tufts University Professor Dan Drezner has offered several that seem appropriately antagonistic toward Russia). The United States should use its influence to provide every nation the opportunity to balance against their aggressive and ambitious neighbors. But the Pax Americana can only be maintained by an America willing to shoulder the burden of hegemony. American shoulders sag under that load today, and her resolve wavers. If the United States should falter, so too will the global peace it guarantees.

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Ash Carter is right. Do not cede one square mile of territory to Moscow. Do not yield to it a zone of influence. Russia does not merit those concessions. Instead, the West should force Moscow to take stock of its perilous position by ensuring that it faces overwhelming and unendurable consequences for threatening the peace. The Kremlin’s gambit will only be successful if the West allows it to be.

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