First, the Brexit vote doesn’t automatically trigger a Brexit. Parliament has to act, and even then they may not immediately trigger Article 50, which creates the off-ramp. Previous momentous steps in British life featured a similar delay between the vote and enactment — think Irish Home Rule in 1912-14 — to create time and space for opponents to organize and find a way to defeat the “winning” result. It’s not over until the U.K. is actually out.

Second, Scotland will probably not leave the United Kingdom. Beyond the fact that there is something a little humorous about good-hearted liberals cheering on the nationalism of Scotland, which would create a 96 percent white ethnostate, there are serious obstacles to Scotland leaving.

Unlike in 2014, Scotland can no longer delude itself that it will become a Nordic-style social democracy, riding a wave of soaring oil revenues to higher living standards and greater equality simultaneously. The U.K. would also have to agree to the independence referendum, a task they may see as too important to take on while conducting negotiations on its exit. And, really, does Scotland want to cede control of its most important trade relationship — with the new Scotland-less U.K. — to Brussels? Lastly, for any of this to work, the SNP would somehow have to convince everyone to allow it the novel route of separating from the U.K. and gaining its own independent status in the EU just as Britain leaves it. This is an enormous leap for a country that, frankly, offers very little to the EU, besides the chance to spite England.

As for the isle to the West, Sinn Fein’s demand for a border poll to end partition is extremely unlikely to result in a united, 32-county Ireland. It’s bluffing.