War, Clausewitz , is the continuation of politics by violent means. But violence is only one tool in a nation’s war arsenal. Other tools include economics, cyber warfare, diplomacy, information warfare (what used to be called propaganda, psychological warfare, and disinformation), espionage, counterintelligence, and subversion. Americans are an impatient people, but impatience in war can lead to the loss of political and popular support — which is essential for democracies to achieve victory.
In the past, American domestic politics and foreign policy has been affected by previous wars. The stalemate of the Korean War caused President Harry Truman not to seek reelection in 1952. Similarly, the failure to achieve victory in Vietnam led to President Lyndon Johnson’s exit from the Democratic Party primaries in 1968. The so-called “lessons of Munich” which preceded the Second World War influenced our policymakers’ decisions in Korea and Vietnam. The Korean War impacted the way we waged war in Southeast Asia. Our ultimate defeat in Southeast Asia also led to the “Vietnam Syndrome,” which imposed psychological and political restrictions on America’s use of force in international relations thereafter.
Ironically, it was a very successful war against Iraq in 1991 that has contributed to America’s impatience about achieving victory and Americans’ expectations that wars can be won with fewer and fewer casualties. In the first Gulf War, the United States accomplished its military and political objectives in 42 days of fighting, including a 100-hour ground campaign, and relatively light combat casualties. Our victory in the Gulf War raised expectations among Americans that wars can be won quickly and at low human cost. We went to war in Afghanistan and again in Iraq in 2002 and 2003 with the expectation that we could achieve swift victories with light casualties, but it didn’t turn out that way. Instead, the Bush 43 administration transformed early battlefield victories into a crusade for global democracy that dragged on for many years with steadily rising casualties. To some extent, we are living through a period of time dominated by what could be called the “Afghan-Iraq Wars Syndrome.”
In Afghanistan, early military success produced a hubris that began a “global war on terror” and our ultimate political defeat there. In Iraq in 2003, Bush’s premature boast of “mission accomplished” was followed by an insurgency that produced more violence and political chaos in that country and led to diminishing support for the war back home. These “endless wars,” to borrow President Trump’s phrase, sapped American confidence and will to such an extent that the phrase “exit strategy” has become a necessary component in every U.S. military action.
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