On paper, NATO’s eastern flank, stretching from Norway and Finland in the Arctic to Romania and Bulgaria on the Black Sea, forms a coherent geopolitical frontline in the Alliance’s strategic stand-off with Russia. All these countries, with one quasi-exception, are now members of both NATO and the EU. Only Norway, which borders Russia directly at the top of the Scandinavian peninsula, breaks the pattern somewhat: It’s not technically an EU country although it aligns closely with Brussels and is part of the Single Market.
This remarkable coherence across the fundamental parameters of defence, economic framework, and geography – a compact line of allies briefly interrupted only by the Gulf of Finland and the Suwalki Gap – is of a relatively recent vintage. Finland only joined NATO in 2023 with Sweden. Romania and Bulgaria joined the EU in 2007. The great Flank may be of enormous importance – the future of European security hinges on its sustainability – but as a political-strategic construct it remains underdeveloped and riven with contradictions that sit below its substantial façade. Of most concern is the continuing divide between its two halves.
In the North, the UK-led Joint Expeditionary Force (JEF) nations, from Britain and the Netherlands through Scandinavia to the Baltic countries and Poland, are operating at a far more advanced and deeper level of defence-industrial, political, military and economic cooperation and coordination (including military interoperability). This activity is building up strategic depth and a serious backstop for the frontline states in the area.
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