U.S. Hawkishness on Russia Makes Deterring China Harder

American hawks often claim that hostile policy towards Russia is in the interests of the United States because it deters China, our main superpower competitor. Their argument is roughly that, if we do not sanction Russia and give money to Ukraine indefinitely, China will feel “emboldened” with the possible result of a kinetic conflict over Taiwan. This policy premise has only strengthened China by forcing the Russians into the hands of the Chinese. Tangibly, American aid to Ukraine and sanctions on Russia have aided the PRC, and particularly its naval forces, in their ongoing nuclear buildup by encouraging Russian technology transfers to China.

Until 2020, China’s nuclear strategy was largely a relic of the Cold War and the Sino–Soviet tensions of the 1970s. Accordingly, China’s nuclear capabilities consisted of a stockpile of nuclear warheads numbering in the low 200s to deter the USSR or Russia and America. Chinese nuclear capabilities were also heavily dependent on land-based systems, largely medium-range. China possessed comparatively few (and noisy) ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs), and lacked air-launched ballistic missile (ALBM) capabilities altogether (and consequently lacked a nuclear triad). 

China has recently embarked upon a massive buildup of its nuclear forces. By mid-2024, China had tripled the number of nuclear warheads in its inventory to over 600, and is currently on-track to have around 1,000 warheads by 2030, establishing it as a nuclear peer of the United States and Russia. In 2019, the Chinese announced their first bomber capable of carrying an ALBM; in 2025, during its Victory Day celebrations, China revealed the existence of its first ALBM, completing its nuclear triad.

The most concerning aspect of China’s nuclear development is the buildup of the sea-based component of China’s nuclear capabilities, most notably through the development of the Type 096 submarine. China has historically lagged in SSBN development and production; it currently has six SSBNs in commission, compared to the 14 operated by both Russia and the United States. China’s SSBNs are also considerably smaller than their American or Russian counterparts.