The PLA and the Limits of Military Modernization

I. More Than Missiles and Maneuvers

As global attention increasingly focuses on a potential conflict in the Taiwan Strait, many observers point to the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) of China as a formidable military force. Armed with hypersonic missiles, stealth aircraft, space-based capabilities, and massive investments in artificial intelligence and cyberwarfare, the PLA appears—on paper—to be one of the world’s most advanced fighting forces. However, military capability is not solely a function of weapons systems or strategic doctrine. It is deeply shaped by institutional structures, internal governance mechanisms, and the alignment between bureaucratic incentives and combat effectiveness.

Drawing on institutional theory, this article argues that the PLA’s institutional design—characterized by political control, opaque decision-making, patronage networks, and limited operational autonomy—significantly undermines its warfighting readiness. In particular, the emphasis on technological modernization has often obscured persistent structural flaws that inhibit learning, accountability, and adaptive command.

II. Institutional Theory and the Military Lens

Institutional theory holds that the rules, norms, and governance structures of organizations fundamentally shape their behavior and performance. Formal structures (e.g., chains of command, procurement processes) and informal dynamics (e.g., guanxi, patronage, fear of political reprisal) collectively condition how an institution functions. When applied to militaries, this perspective explains why states with similar technologies can perform very differently in combat...