From all indications, the proposed fiscal agreement in Germany between the Christian Democrats (CDU-CSU) and the Social Democrats (SPD) and the Greens is an inadequate approach to correct the chronic errors of the entire post-Schroeder era, (and only starts after Gerhard Schroeder because he did rather courageously roll back the sumptuous German welfare system). And it is a prospective agreement between the wrong contractants. The Greens should have no more influence in German public life and not one more pfennig should be consecrated to the nonsense about climate change. The enthusiasm for deregulation and the belated recognition that Germany’s formerly powerhouse auto industry has been regulated into a distressed state are commendable. But a formal or informal coalition of precisely the elements that dragged Germany down to its present stagnant and parlous economic condition is not a believable source for the radical changes that will be necessary to capitalise on the great skill and proverbial diligence of the German workforce.

Everyone can salute Chancellor-elect Friedrich Merz’ ultimate victory over his old rival Angela Merkel. Unlike other long serving federal chancellors, Konrad Adenauer and Helmut Kohl, the Merkel era was one of endless temporizing – she never did by haves what could be done by quarters. The greatest error was not the admission of an unassimilable mass of destitute immigrants from places where Germany had been no part of the problems of the countries in the origin. It was a mistake, politically and otherwise; it was to put unfair competitive strain on German citizens of modest income in the costs of necessities, but it surely indicated the former chancellor’s compassionate spirit which, while bad policy, reflects creditably upon her character.

The greatest disaster was the combination of Chancellor Merkel’s self-abasement before the green militants and her aggressive abdication of Germany’s right and duty to begin, altogether within the framework of the Western Alliance and with respect for the civilised and democratic principles of that Alliance, to exercise responsibly the vocation of a united Germany to be the most influential power in Europe. In doing this, she could have resumed the role that was last exercised by Bismarck from his founding of the united German Empire in 1871 until his dismissal by the hyperactive and self-destructively misguided child-man Emperor Wilhelm II in 1890. After provoking and winning the Danish, Austrian, and Franco-Prussian Wars, which were brief and by previous and subsequent European standards or compared to the US Civil War or even the Crimean War, relatively moderate in terms of combat deaths, Bismarck became the guardian of European peace. He befriended Russia which prevented it from allying itself with France, did absolutely nothing to annoy the British, which sustained them in their self-described policy of ”splendid isolation” from the continent,  and he went to some lengths to avoid any further abrasions with France. (After unjustly stealing Alsace and Lorraine, the French spirit of revanchism was not going to abate easily or spontaneously.)