Ending the wars in Ukraine and Gaza are at the top of President Donald Trump’s foreign policy agenda, and many expect the new administration to change American policy in both. It may well try to. But unless Russian President Vladimir Putin and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu play along, Trump could easily find himself shifting back toward the Biden administration’s approach in both theaters—because U.S. interests and geopolitical realities don’t change with the election returns.

Popular discussion often approaches war through the prisms of morality or law or justice. Beneath all of these, however, lie interest and power. Every war begins with differing views on the belligerents’ relative power, as each side thinks itself strong enough to achieve important goals by fighting. As the battlefield tests their relative strength, the situation becomes clearer and views converge. When both sides agree on their relative power, having marked their ambitions to market, the war’s endgame begins.

In both Ukraine and Gaza, many things have become clearer over time: how much military and economic potential the belligerent coalitions have, how easily that potential can be transformed into usable power, how likely that power is to be deployed in the field, and what it can and can’t accomplish there. This new clarity could help produce settlements of both wars in the coming year, based on realistic assessments of which objectives each side cares most about and can afford. Whether the settlements last, however—whether they produce peace rather than merely a pause in fighting—will depend on the details.