As the war reached its 1000th day this week, any form of victory seems further away from Kyiv’s grasp than ever before. Militarily, Ukraine’s situation is dramatic; politically, after the US election, it is irrecoverable. Soon, the West – especially Europe – may have to face the final results of its Ukraine policy. We should not shy from discussing the worst case scenario, not least because the record of Western strategy over the past 30 years suggests that versions of the worst are rather likely. The full reality of where things could realistically end for Ukraine is almost too hideous to contemplate, but it is important to be clear on the risks so we avoid even greater policy mistakes as the endgame approaches.

Negative prospects

The greatest risk is that Ukraine becomes Europe’s insoluble, festering, forever-problem and a recurring source of conflict with a major military power; a war-torn land that never gets to recover, locked in a spiral of resentment, corruption and violence, drained of talent and living on the charity of its sponsors; and perhaps an inadvertent exporter of trouble, including vast refugee flows, among its neighbours. Some might find in this parallels with how Palestine is seen by many Arab states.

Horrific as it sounds, this is what is potentially at stake in this war against an implacable foe like Russia. A regime like Putin’s that was able to unleash such hell upon Ukraine in 2022, after all the tragic lessons of the 20th century (including for Russia itself), cannot be expected to let go of its prey and make any concessions in victory – if it achieves it – regardless of what the ceasefire or peace agreement eventually says. 

President Zelensky took a huge gamble in March 2022 when he decided to end the incipient Istanbul peace talks with Russia, encouraged by “ironclad” promises of long-term Western support and by the upsurge in patriotic mobilisation at home and moral mobilisation in Ukraine’s favour abroad. After surviving Putin’s initial onslaught and saving Kyiv, suddenly “defeating Russia” appeared to many as not only possible, but feasible. The risk of eventually losing the war after years of heavy fighting and untold Ukrainian deaths – and ending up in the same situation as in March 2022 or worse – was perhaps difficult to judge clearly at that point in time.