On September 10, Nils Andreas Stensoenes, head of the Norwegian Intelligence Service, stated that he believes Russia will likely conduct more sabotage operations against European energy infrastructure because the risk level has changed as Russia’s war in Ukraine prolongs and the West continues to aid Ukraine (Evropeyskaya Pravda, September 11). Over the past year, reports have proliferated that the Russian Federation, along with increasing its military presence, is conducting intensive research on the underwater infrastructure of the Atlantic Ocean, potentially creating a threat to the global network of cables through which almost all Internet and financial traffic flows. Simply put, this complex of underwater cables ensures global connectivity. Any significant damage to this network would threaten global trade, military readiness, logistics, and Internet connectivity. According to various estimates, over $10 trillion in financial transactions, commercial payments, and trade operations occur worldwide every day. More than 95 percent of global communications are carried out through a network of approximately 500 cables laid across the world’s oceans (TSN.ua, February 22). The potential threat emanating from Moscow worries Western military and political leadership, who are highly dependent on the resilience of these communication lines.

The protection of underwater cables is a tactical mission for the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), with strategic implications for the functioning of its members’ national economies and security apparatuses. In recent years, NATO allies have identified several instances of suspicious activity around underwater infrastructure (see EDM, October 4, 2022). In April, Vice-Admiral Didier Maleterre, deputy commander of NATO’s Allied Maritime Command, stated, “Russians have developed a lot of hybrid warfare under the sea to disrupt the European economy, through cables, Internet cables, pipelines” (Unian.net, April 24). Additionally, concerns are growing that Russia may target underwater cables and other critical infrastructure to disrupt life in the West and gain leverage over those countries providing security assistance to Ukraine.

The special military unit at the Main Directorate for Deep-Sea Research of the Ministry of Defense (GUGI) is the Kremlin’s primary tool for conducting such sabotage operations. GUGI has a significant fleet of surface oceanographic vessels, submarines, and marine submersibles, including those with nuclear engines. The missions carried out by deep-sea submarines are mostly classified (Topwar.ru, May 15, 2020). GUGI’s main base is located on the Kola Peninsula in Olenya Bay, which is covered with a network of boom barriers and sensors. Sea mines have also been installed in the area. Both GUGI ships and submarines can locate and destroy underwater cables, using deep-sea divers or operating remotely (The Barents Observer, June 15, 2023). Hypothetically, all underwater cables, at depths ranging from several dozen to 6,000 meters (~6,560 yards), are within reach of GUGI’s sabotage units.