Deferring to an agency or a university on the question of what policies best serve a compelling interest is one thing; deferring on the question of what constitutes a compelling interest is another, much bigger, thing. But that is what the Court has done up to now.

But no longer. As the majority opinion today noted: “The universities’ main response to these criticisms is ‘trust us.’ They assert that universities are owed deference when using race to benefit some applicants but not others. While this Court has recognized a “tradition of giving a degree of deference to a university’s academic decisions,” it has made clear that deference must exist ‘within constitutionally prescribed limits.’”

“Trust us” was essentially the argument offered by the University of Michigan in Grutter, and one that was cheerfully accepted by the majority there. Not so much today.

But who trusts higher education anymore?

[Interesting point, and that may have more ramifications for the Chevron doctrine in the next term. It also points to the way in which this court has inarguably become more conservative: the rise of textual law over deference to experts. That is a very salutary trend, and hopefully it continues well into the future. — Ed]