The impact on Russia’s high command, the third question raised by the insurrection, could be more severe. The divisions and intrigues inside Russia’s leadership are becoming more apparent. On June 28th the New York Times reported that General Sergei Surovikin, the commander of Russian forces in Ukraine between October and January, had prior knowledge of the rebellion. The same day, the Wall Street Journal said that Mr Prigozhin had intended to kidnap Sergei Shoigu, Russia’s defence minister, and General Valery Gerasimov, the country’s chief of general staff, during their visit to a region near Ukraine’s border. Both reports cited American intelligence. “Fractures at that command level could have a longer-term effect on the unity of the campaign,” says Mr King.

For now, Ukraine is making slower progress than many American and European officials had hoped. “It is still too early to tell how successful the ongoing counteroffensive will be,” acknowledged General Sir Patrick Sanders, Britain’s army chief, on June 26th, adding: “Russia has been a country of comebacks.” Ukraine has yet to commit the majority of its new Western-equipped brigades. But its initial attacks against well-defended Russian positions, including minefields, have exposed its troops’ limited training. They have taken heavy casualties, according to people familiar with the details.

[I think that it will take more chaos for there to be a noticeable impact on the front lines in the short run. But Russia can’t add more resources now and have lost some significant resources in this chaos, and the purges that will likely come will further degrade Russian capability. In the longer run, Russia’s leadership and military look like they have run out of gas, and Ukraine has better morale and better weapons now. — Ed]