Xi himself has made few references to any concrete plans relating to Taiwan, beyond linking “reunification” with the goal of “national rejuvenation”, which he has promised will be completed by 2049. He has said twice, first in 2013 and again in 2019, that the issue of Taiwan cannot be passed down “from generation to generation”, but this is sufficiently vague to give him flexibility. China’s Anti-Secession Law, meanwhile, stipulates that “non-peaceful means” would only be used against Taiwan when all other possibilities have been “completely exhausted”, and Xi has stressed that “time and momentum” are on Beijing’s side.

Any decision to launch an assault on Taiwan will be political, and it will only be taken as a last resort. The military campaign alone would be an extraordinarily risky undertaking, with the PLA mounting an amphibious assault over more than 100 miles of water, against an adversary that would almost certainly be backed by the US military. Even assuming that was successful, they would then be faced with the challenge of occupying Taiwan, which has a population of more than 23 million people and mountainous territory that is well suited to an insurgency. Then there would be the extensive sanctions that would halt China’s economic rise and destroy a core plank of the Communist Party’s legitimacy.