Russia’s strategy has already made an impact. Sri Lanka’s president was recently deposed: He faced an economic crisis, and Russian oil and food disruption intensified it enough to trigger blackouts and mass anger, triggering an assault on the presidential compound. Rising fertilizer prices have had effects in Thailand and other agriculture-reliant states. Signs exist that the fertilizer shortage may be fading, as suppliers redistribute inventories and accelerate production.

Yet global food and fuel shortages will persist. Warming Middle Eastern temperatures and an extant food and energy crisis in Africa will combine with food shortages to create a global macroeconomic storm. The results are unpredictable. But another round of violence in Central or North Africa, for example, prompted by dire economic conditions, could trigger a migrant wave that stresses European political systems, and a series of unforeseen developing-world contingencies that the West cannot ignore.

Russia may not have time to see this strategy through to fruition. The West will feel the energy squeeze only this winter. Even then, a mild winter could blunt the Russian gas weapon. And a successful Ukrainian counteroffensive in the south will threaten to unravel Russia’s entire position, reduce its leverage over Ukraine, and shred its war aims. Moreover, as the Russian central bank has openly admitted, Russia will not feel the full effect of Western sanctions until this fall and winter as its currency reserves are depleted. Once that begins, Russia will be in an increasingly weak position.