If, contrary to Macron and Scholz, the war cannot end via agreement, then it can end only by means of a victory — either by the Russians, or by the Ukrainians. That may mean a short war or a long war, but, whatever the length, there will be war until one side — preferably imperialist Russia — loses.

That’s one of the reasons why today’s “fatigue” is unlikely to be long-lived. The West is beginning to appreciate that Putin is a menace, Russia is an unregenerate rogue, and that their victory would portend a variety of dreadful consequences for the world. First, authoritarianism would get a shot in the arm, while democracy and liberalism would continue to wither away. Second, fascist Russia would come to border the European Union and NATO, threatening their security and probably testing Western resolve to defend itself by continuing its encroachments on the Baltic states and Poland. Third, Russia’s stranglehold on Europe’s energy needs would tighten as well, while its seizure of Ukraine’s agricultural lands would add to its clout on global grain markets. All these factors would produce a major shift in power that would not favor the West.

The second reason for today’s fatigue being short-lived is that the West has sunk enormous costs into Ukraine and has created a variety of institutional mechanisms for channeling its aid. Sunk costs are always an obstacle to bolting, and institutions usually develop momentum of their own and dictate policy as much as they execute it. Given the West’s already high commitment to Ukraine, it’s very likely to be sustained even after fissures in the Western coalition appear, Western economies slow down, and the prospect of a long war with huge additional costs becomes reality. Whether or not the West will remain as committed to Ukraine for as long as the United States was present in Afghanistan is unclear, but the time is sure to be longer than a few years.