For years, many within the Russia-watching community have argued that Putin’s departure would likely unleash instability inside Russia and exacerbate its foreign aggression. For instance, a new leader who needed to consolidate power could stoke nationalist or anti-Western undercurrents already present in Russia to boost public support. Or, lacking Putin’s ability to balance Russia’s competing factions, elite infighting could spark political upheaval and violence that could destabilize the country, which after all is a nuclear power. According to this line of reasoning, Putin’s critics should be careful what they wish for: a Russia without Putin could be even worse for the West.

This view held some intellectual merit prior to Putin’s invasion of Ukraine, but now that argument is growing weaker by the day. To justify the war, Putin has stoked a dark and ugly nationalism inside Russia. His propaganda has convinced many Russians of the legitimacy of his senseless “de-nazification” campaign in Ukraine, so much so that some Russians have come to view the killing of Ukrainian civilians as acceptable. Putin openly speaks of “national traitors” and the need to “cleanse” them from society. Repression has soared and Russians have taken to reporting on “anti-patriotic” activities of their fellow citizens. And it is possible that even darker days lie ahead; the worse Russia fares in Ukraine, the greater the prospect that Putin will turn to cyberattacks or chemical or nuclear weapons to avoid the perception of defeat.

We have studied autocratic regimes for many years, and the empirical record increasingly supports the conclusion that a Russia with Putin is likely to be worse than one without him.