The mass terror was the direct consequence of mass lying, for it is easier to expend ammunition on a bunch of fleeing civilians than to engage a real military target. Even the looting has become organized. Ruslan Leviev, founder of the open-source-based Conflict Intelligence Team, claimed in an interview that soldiers are driving stolen cars laden with loot to Russia to sell them on improvised markets, and they pay part of the proceeds to their officers.

This is truly amazing. A modern army doesn’t loot. It is doubtful that the same army that left Bucha toting trophy dishwashers will be able to regroup swiftly to fight in the Donbas.

How did Mr. Putin think he could win this war? The answer has to do with state delusion. It is easy to mistake Russia for a military state. It isn’t. It’s true that the Russian state is run by siloviki (roughly translated as “the enforcers”), but those strongmen are from the Federal Security Service, known as the FSB, not the army.

Mr. Putin, himself a former KGB officer, has long been highly suspicious of a possible army coup. The incompetence of the Russian military is at least partly intentional—designed to reinforce that the FSB, not the army, was in charge of running Russian society. The FSB and its political allies told Mr. Putin what he wanted to hear: namely, that Russia had an extensive network of sympathizers in Ukraine who would hand the country to him on a platter. A state with this level of incompetence and delusion simply wouldn’t have survived in the 19th century.