But Russia does not seem predisposed to the kinds of changes necessary to seize victory from the jaws of defeat. Unlike the examples above, there does not appear to be an emerging Russian Marshall or Scipio, leaders who could potentially make the required structural or operational changes to the Russian military. In fact, President Vladimir Putin’s paranoia and byzantine structures of patronage and control make it less likely for a radical reformer and innovator to make the necessary modifications to Russian operations. Further, to do so would require a more open admission to the Russian people about the nature of the war in Ukraine. It would be hard to explain a mass mobilization like the ones the United States and Rome had to undertake after their initial failures while telling the Russian people that “all is going according to plan” in a war where official casualty reporting may reflect 10% or less of the actual number of Russians killed. Instead, Putin seems to have favored calling on militias, outside forces and allies like Kadyrovite Chechens, Assadist Syrians and Dagestani recruits. The fact that Putin continues to pressure an indecisive President Alexander Lukashenko for Belarusian troops suggests the Russian president lacks confidence in his own forces’ ability to achieve his goals on their own.

Russia is also losing forces that can’t be easily replicated. In leading the invasion with the most nominally elite forces conducting wildly unsuccessful and costly operations, Russia has paid a disproportionate cost among their VDV (Airborne), GRU (military intelligence) and Spetsnaz (special) forces. These were specially selected Russian forces that, before the conflict, had been the best trained, best equipped and most motivated. This isn’t merely a matter of high losses in these formations, but in some cases — as with reports of the 331st Guards Airborne Regiment — these units have ceased to exist. Units with storied traditions and histories going back to World War II have been wiped out. Even if Russia were to increase its domestic recruitment, these new forces would be, at least initially, less prepared and effective than the forces that have already incurred heavy losses and proved relatively ineffective throughout Ukraine.