If the CIA can’t discern Beijing’s intentions, I certainly can’t either. But while Xi Jinping’s plans remain hazy, his regime’s best interests look clearer. The Chinese Communist Party has a strong economic and political incentive to avoid exposing itself to western sanctions, and providing offensive weaponry to Russia’s army would guarantee such sanctions. Meanwhile, Beijing is all but certain to retain Moscow’s allegiance, even if it refuses to pony up surface-to-air missiles; the Kremlin is not in a position to turn down a friendship with China, no matter how one-sided or fair weather it might be. For these reasons, it would not make much sense for China to provide military aid to Russia.

If China’s foreign policy were determined solely by its national economic interests, then the conflict between Russia and the West would pose no conundrum; Beijing would simply align with the latter. Dealings with the U.S. and European Union composed more than a quarter of China’s total trade in 2020, while exchange with Russia accounted for just 2.5 percent. Today, roughly 35 percent of China’s exports go to Americans and Europeans. And the Chinese economy is in no position to weather a sudden drop in export demand.