The brutality of Russia’s bombardment of Ukraine, even at this relatively early stage in the war, “has strong 1999–2000 Grozny vibes,” Michael Kofman, an expert on the Russian military at the Center for Naval Analyses, told me. Having failed to achieve its objectives in the early days of its invasion, Kofman said that the Russian military now appears to be settling in for a much longer war that would result in the attrition of forces and the destruction of cities. Putin showed his willingness to deploy scorched-earth tactics in Syria and Chechnya, where arguably far less was at stake. Anything but victory in Ukraine could be seen by Putin as an existential threat, not only to Russia, but to his own grasp on power. “He is not in a place politically where he can afford to accept a humiliating defeat,” Kofman said. “Just as Ukrainians are determined in their defense, Vladimir Putin is determined to win.”

Oz Katerji, a freelance conflict journalist based in Kyiv, who witnessed Russia’s besiegment of Syria firsthand during the civil war, told me that the targeting of hospitals and other civilian centers, which has already begun in Ukraine, is central to Russia’s military doctrine. “Russia doesn’t necessarily need to go into those areas and risk losing huge amounts of manpower and armor when it could just cut them off, besiege them, bomb them, [and] starve them into submission,” he said. “It’s a deliberate, cynical strategy.”

A more brutal military campaign doesn’t necessarily mean a shorter one, though. Even if Russian troops are able to seize control of Kyiv and other major cities, they will face the arguably greater challenge of occupying the country, not to mention suppressing a potentially violent insurgency. Although a Ukrainian resistance probably wouldn’t be able to deny Putin a military victory in the country, it could at the very least prevent him from declaring a political one.