To be sure, Moscow would have planned any war directly involving NATO very differently. But in terms of conventional deterrence, the damage is done: the limitations of Russia’s military, and the deluded judgments informing its employment, have left an indelible impression, making the threat of Russian conventional military power less convincing than before, even while the perceived need to defend against it has increased.

Furthermore, Putin’s invasion has dispelled the (largely misconceived) mystique of “hybrid warfare” that grew around his military actions in Ukraine and Syria in the mid-2010s. Instead, Moscow’s dreaded global disinformation machine fizzled dramatically with unconvincing false flag operations, its notorious hackers failed to produce notable exploits in cyber-destabilization, and its electronic warfare units are puzzlingly missing.

Instead, “new generation warfare” tactics U.S. analysts observed Russian forces practicing in Syria and Ukraine, which emphasized use of drones and electronic reconnaissance to direct precision air and artillery strikes, now seem to have been only reflective of what a limited subset of Russia’s military could do, and then only under specific conditions.