In this context, other governments, and particularly that of the United States, have a responsibility to consider the outcomes of retaliatory economic measures. Russian history professor Gregory Afinogenov of Georgetown University argues at Dissent that sanctions against Putin himself will do little to change his behavior here because Putin is largely motivated by concerns other than material wealth. Sanctions against oligarchs, Afinogenov argues, will only increase their dependence on the Kremlin for economic security (though, I would add, some measures labeled as sanctions, like ending “golden passport” schemes that allow Russian oligarchs to buy Western citizenship, are justified for other reasons). Afinogenov reserves his strongest criticism, however, for broad sanctions that primarily hurt the Russian working class:

[C]utting Russia off from SWIFT and freezing central bank assets are the worst [sanctions], because they lead to hyperinflation and shortages of key imports that millions of vulnerable Russians depend on. Putin has already anticipated the likely effects of all three types of sanctions and therefore will not be deterred by them; neither have sanctions ever worked to catalyze effective political opposition to the regime (or to other regimes targeted by Western sanctions). [Dissent]

This is correct. There is little evidence the U.S. sanctions which target ordinary people in Russia (and many, many other nations) do much other than giving the regime a scapegoat for economic troubles and a pretext for cracking down on domestic opposition.